The Emergence of Crowdinvesting in Europe by Hornuf, Lars & Schwienbacher, Armin
Lars Hornuf and Armin Schwienbacher:
The Emergence of Crowdinvesting in Europe
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-43
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21388/
Lars Hornuf und Armin Schwienbacher:
The Emergence of Crowdinvesting in Europe
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-43
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21388/
! 1!
The emergence of crowdinvesting in Europe:  
With an in-depth analysis of the German market 
 
Lars Hornuf 
University of Trier and IAAEU, Germany 
 
Armin Schwienbacher 
Université de Lille–SKEMA Business School, France 
 
 
This Version: August 27, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
* Contact address of authors: Lars Hornuf, University of Trier, Department of Economics and Institute for Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union, Behringstraße 21, D - 54296 Trier (Germany), Phone: +49 651 
201 4744, Email: hornuf@iaaeu.de; Armin Schwienbacher, Université de Lille, Faculté de Finance, Banque, et 
Comptabilité, Rue de Mulhouse 2 - BP 381, F – 59020 Lille Cédex (France), Phone: +33 3 20 90 74 73, Email: 
armin.schwienbacher@skema.edu. The authors thank Francois Carbone (Anaxago) and Guillaume Desclée 
(MyMicroInvest) for insightful discussions as well as seminar and conference participants at the European Central 
Bank (ECB Committee on Financial Integration), Université Lille 2 (Centre René Demogue), Bruegel Institute 
(Finance Focus Breakfast), and the Belgian Entrepreneurship Research Day 2014 for insightful comments on a 
previous version of this manuscript. 
  
! 2!
The emergence of crowdinvesting in Europe: With an in-depth analysis of the German market 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the development of the Internet-based crowdinvesting market in Europe since its start 
in 2007. It evidences a great variety in portal design and contract forms used by crowdinvesting portals. 
By analyzing more detailed, hand-collected data on the complete set of successful and unsuccessful 
crowdinvesting campaigns run in Germany, the paper further tests whether different portal and 
contractual mechanisms affect crowd participation. The latter is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
precondition for achieving “wisdom of the crowd”. Consistent with predictions on the different 
mechanisms used, the results show that crowd participation is largest when the minimum ticket size is 
small, the crowd is pooled in a financial vehicle, and the crowd is offered investments in the form of 
profit-particiapting loans (so-called partiarische Darlehen). Moreover, the very same mechanisms 
increase the chance of achieving successful campaigns and of raising larger amounts. These findings are 
useful for entrepreneurs who need to choose among a large range of crowdinvesting portals and other 
forms of entrepreneurial finance. 
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1. Introduction  
 With the emergence of crowdinvesting in Europe, the sale of financial securities by startup firms 
to a crowd of small investors has become a viable alternative to financing through professional investors, 
such as business angels and venture capitalists. Many entrepreneurs have used this new opportunity to 
raise seed and early-stage capital to finance their growth and R&D activities (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 
2014). Crowdinvesting 1 , which is also referred to as investment-based crowdfunding 2 , securities 
crowdfunding3, and equity crowdfunding4, can help fill the funding gap of innovative startups that have 
capital needs too large for friends and family and too small for professional investors5 (see Cressy, 2012, 
for a general discussion of funding gaps), as well as investors who do not meet the very selective industry 
and growth criteria of professional investors.!
Crowdinvesting is a subcategory of crowdfunding, which is profoundly different from other 
subcategories of this novel form of entrepreneurial finance (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012; Agrawal 
et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014). The donation-based crowdfunding model involves the financing of 
philanthropic projects. Under such a model, backers donate money to support a project without expecting 
compensation. This differs under the reward-based model of crowdfunding in which backers are promised 
tangible or intangible perks, such as a supporter T-shirt or having their name posted on the campaign 
website. At times, the reward-based model of crowdfunding may resemble pre-purchase, such as when 
backers finance a product or service they wish to consume and which is still to be developed by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In this paper, we rely on the term “crowdinvesting” (Klöhn and Hornuf, 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014) 
and refer to the Internet-based investment in a startup company by a large number of natural persons—sometimes 
accompanied by co-investments of professional investors (e.g., angel investors, venture capitalists)—with the 
intention to obtain the residual claim on the future cash flows of a firm. 
2 See the FCA Consultation Paper CP13/13 “The FCA’s regulatory approach to crowdfunding (and similar 
activities)” as well as the European Securities and Markets Authority “Opinion Investment-based crowdfunding”. 
3 See Knight et al. (2012) and the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR Parts 200, 227, 232 et al. 
Crowdfunding; Proposed Rule. 
4 See, for example, the JOBS Act, including the term “crowdfunding” referring to transactions involving the sale of a 
security. Ahlers et al. (2015, p. 958) define the term “equity crowdfunding” as an investment model in which 
investors receive “some form of equity or equity-like arrangements”. 
5 In a legal sense, professional investors are usually accredited or qualified investors. To become an accredited 
investor under the national regulation, professional investors need to meet certain wealth and/or experience 
requirements (see Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015, for more details). The bulk of the crowd are non-accredited 
investors though.  
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venture. Popular examples are video games (e.g., Star Citizen) or the Pebble smartwatch. Crowdinvesting 
is a sub-category of crowdfunding in which backers expect financial compensation for their investments. 
To persuade the crowd to participate in the future cash flows of a firm, fundraisers in some jurisdictions 
offer equity shares in a private limited liability company (LLC). In the United Kingdom (UK), for 
example, this is the case on portals such as Crowdcube or Seedrs. In Germany, startups cannot easily offer 
common shares in a private LLC, because the transfer of these shares requires the involvement of a costly 
notary (Braun et al., 2013). As a result, firms engaging in a crowdinvesting campaign frequently offer 
investments in the form of profit-participating loans (so-called partiarische Darlehen) 6  or silent 
partnerships, which replicate the uncertain future cash flows of the firm and are usually payed out after the 
investment contract expires or the startup is bought by a professional investor. As a result, crowdinvesting 
is also fundamentally different from crowdlending or loan-based crowdfunding, in which investors invest 
in personal or business loans and receive a pre-determined periodic interest payment from the debtors. 
Before a startup is approved to raise capital on a crowdinvesting website, the startup and the portal 
must agree on a valuation of the firm and the founders must decide how much capital they want to raise. 
According to the valuation and capital needs of the firm, the portal provides a standardized financial 
contract that is offered to the crowd. Under what is known as the all-or-nothing model of crowdinvesting, 
founders set a funding goal and keep nothing unless that goal is reached (Cumming et al., 2014). All 
German crowdinvesting portals operate under such an all-or-nothing model. Frequently, the funding goal 
is set at 50,000 EUR. If this amount cannot be raised within a pre-specified period, the capital pledged by 
the crowd is given back to the potential investors. Moreover, most German crowdinvesting portals 
operating under an all-or-nothing model allocate shares on a first-come, first-served basis. Under this 
model, founders set an overall funding limit, which is typically larger than the funding goal, and stop 
selling securities to the crowd when that limit is reached. To avoid the often costly disclosure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Note that though profit-participating loans are termed “loans”, they represent a mezzanine financial instrument 
replicating the uncertain future cash flows of the startup and therefore fall under the definition of crowdinvesting 
and not crowdlending. 
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requirements that come with national securities law, startups typically use exemptions from the prospectus 
regime, setting the funding limit at 100,000 EUR, or use investment contracts such as profit-participating 
loans that traditionally do not fall under the disclosure regime (Klöhn et al., 2015). 
 While a few studies have explained the functioning of reward-based and loan-based 
crowdfunding7, little is known about crowdinvesting experiences of entrepreneurs. In particular, one often 
advocated benefit of crowdfunding and, thus, also crowdinvesting over other forms of entrepreneurial 
finance is that it makes use of the “wisdom of the crowd”; the participation of many individuals generates 
information through the aggregation of individual decisions that cannot be obtained from a single 
individual or investor (Girotra et al., 2010; Bayus, 2013; Kelley and Tetlock, 2013; Lyon and Pacuit, 
2013; Hakenes and Schlegel, 2014). Although the information content in individual decisions may 
constitute vague but diverse information, when aggregated, it may provide a better picture of the potential 
of the entrepreneurial startup (Hakenes and Schlegel, 2014). In the case of crowdinvesting, the fact that 
the participating crowd makes investment decisions rather than consumption decisions can be particularly 
useful. Indeed, the information inferred from investments by the crowd relates to the value of the firm 
more generally, rather than personal consumption preferences for a specific product. In this paper, we do 
not explore how wisdom of the crowd may manifest itself; rather, we investigate different contractual and 
portal mechanisms through which the entrepreneur can affect crowd participation in crowdinvesting 
campaigns. Such participation constitutes a necessary condition for achieving the wisdom of the crowd. 
 The issuance of securities by firms is heavily regulated and requires that issuing firms draft a 
securities prospectus to submit to the national securities regulator before an offer can be made to the 
general public. Unlike in the United States (US), crowdinvesting in Europe can develop with the 
participation of non-accredited investors, due to the existence of exemptions from the prospectus 
requirement. Within these exemptions, firms can sell securities or other investments, such as profit-
participating loans or silent partnerships, to the crowd without a costly prospectus. The main exemption is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2014) offer an up-to-date overview of findings in their Appendix.  
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a threshold on the total offer that can be made to the general public. In many European countries, this 
threshold has been 100,000 EUR but can range up to 5 million EUR (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015). 
This contrasts with the US, where crowdinvesting is still limited to accredited investors and thus takes 
place without the larger crowd of non-accredited investors (Bradford, 2012; Knight et al., 2012)8. The past 
years therefore have witnessed an active period of experimentation of crowdinvesting in Europe (similar 
to that of venture capital financing practices in the US in the 1980s; Suchman, 1995), in which portals 
have adopted different funding structures and contract forms.  
In Europe, existing portals and contracts differentiate themselves along several dimensions, 
including the form of securities offered to the crowd (ranging from ordinary shares to mezzanine 
investments), whether the crowd invests directly in the startup or whether investments are pooled through 
a financial vehicle, and the minimum ticket (minimum investment required), which ranges from 1 EUR to 
several thousand euros. These different mechanisms are likely to affect crowd participation. The minimum 
ticket imposed by portals directly affects the composition of the crowd, as only wealthier individuals are 
likely to participate if the minimum ticket is set high (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014)9. Similarly, 
contracts that pool crowd investors in a financial vehicle also facilitate the participation of more investors, 
because they lead to a structure with only one new shareholder for the entrepreneur. This simplified 
ownership structure facilitates governance after the investment takes place. Pooling can also reduce the 
costs of second-round investments by sophisticated investors because the latter can negotiate with a single, 
professional counterparty rather than a diversified crowd. More specifically to Germany, profit-
particiapting loans were adopted by many portals since 2012 because, until recently, they did not qualify 
as investments under the German Investment Act (Vermögensanlagengesetz) and allowed raising an 
unlimited amount of capital without issuing a costly securities prospectus (for details on the old and new 
regulation, see Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015; Klöhn et al., 2015). More precisely, using profit-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  Title III of the JOBS Act will make crowdinvesting possible in the US. However, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission has not yet implemented it, notably because of concerns about risks of fraud. 
9  Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2014) report that members of Innovestment, a German portal that requires a high 
minimum investment ticket, are high net worth individuals. Findings reported in the same study about Anaxago, a 
French portal also with a high minimum ticket, confirm this view. 
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particiapting loans enabled issuers to raise overall larger amounts of capital without being required to draft 
a costly securities prospectus, which they otherwise would have had to submit to the securities regulator 
when using investments different from profit-particiapting loans and if the total offer exceeds the 
thereshold of 100,000 EUR. Thus, using profit-particiapting loans can be thought of as transaction cost 
minimizing for the issuer. 
 These mechanisms offer different ways for entrepreneurs to affect the crowd’s access to an 
investment. In particular, we expect that lower minimum tickets for investors, the use of pooling through 
financial vehicles, and the use of profit-particiapting loans allow larger crowd participation, which in turn 
may enable entrepreneurs to make better use of the crowd’s wisdom. In contrast, higher minimum tickets, 
direct investments by the crowd, and the use of securities requiring a prospectus and thus providing 
shareholders with stronger control rights offer greater incentives to attract a few but more sophisticated 
investors, each of whom invests larger amounts. Thus, we expect the choice of portal and specific 
contractual mechanisms to affect crowd participation, which ultimately also affects the success and 
fundraising capacity of startups.  
 We test these predictions using detailed information on the full set of successful and unsuccessful 
crowdinvesting campaigns that have taken place in Germany from the emergence of the nascant market 
until September 2014. We hand-collected a unique sample of 181 German crowdinvesting campaigns 
from 16 portals up to the end of September 2014. Sample statistics report that 83% of the campaigns were 
successful in achieving their stated funding goal. The average amount raised is 182,945 EUR, including 
the unsuccessful ones, for which we use the amount that was pledged by the crowd at the end of the 
funding period. On average, 251 investors participated in the campaigns.  
 From the multivariate analysis, we derive three main results. First, campaigns that use 
mechanisms that facilitate crowd participation (e.g., small minimum tickets, pooled investments, profit-
participating loans) do attract more investors. This finding corroborates our prediction about the use of 
these mechanisms. For example, reducing the minimum ticket by 100 EUR attracts, on average, between 
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38 and 41 investors more, depending on the specification of the model. Similarly, the use of profit-
participating loans increases the number of crowd investors by at least 372. Second, the same mechanisms 
increase entrepreneurs’ success probability of achieving their funding targets. In economic terms, a 
reduction of the minimum ticket size by 100 EUR increases the probability of funding success by 2%–3%. 
The use of profit-participating loans increases success probability by approximately 22%. We find 
qualitatively similar results for the amount raised. Third, campaigns launched on established portals (those 
that have completed more deals already) are more likely to attract more investors, achieve their goals, and 
raise larger amounts. This finding implies that portals gain from investing in reputation building and 
experience accumulation. However, the results on portal experience are not robust to all the specifications 
shown. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in multiple ways. Several recent studies have examined 
other forms of crowdfunding, especially reward-based crowdfunding (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2011; 
Belleflamme et al., 2014; Colombo et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2014; 
Mollick, 2014). In contrast, crowdinvesting remains an under-researched area of entrepreneurial finance, 
mostly because of the short history of the phenomenon and the lack of micro-level data on campaigns. 
Given the differences in crowd motivation, examining crowdinvesting separately from other forms is 
crucial because conclusions drawn for other forms of crowdfunding cannot be transposed directly to 
crowdinvesting. A noticeable exception to this dearth of research on the topic is the study by Ahlers et al. 
(2015), who use data from the Australian equity portal ASSOB; however, they only consider a single 
portal and a single form of contract. Thus, their study does not allow researchers to examine the impact of 
portal and contract characteristics and is limited to analyzing successful campaigns. In addition, the portal 
they investigate is a small market segment of a stock exchange, in which shares sold can be traded 
immediately after the crowdinvesting campaign. Their study does, however, shed light on signaling 
mechanisms employed by entrepreneurs that are directly attributed to startup characteristics. We expand 
their analysis by considering campaigns run on different portals, which enables us to observe variations in 
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contracts as well as portal structures that directly affect crowd participation. Our study adds to the 
understanding of which contractual mechanisms affect crowd participation and the capacity of 
entrepreneurs to raise funds through crowdinvesting.  
 Moreover, we contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial finance and economics from another, 
broader empirical perspective. This study is the first to empirically document the emergence of 
crowdinvesting in Europe since its start in 2007. Using an extended data set that comprises campaigns run 
on portals located in other European countries until the end of 2013, we can provide a comprehensive 
picture of the development of this nascent market in Europe.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the development of the 
crowdinvesting market in Europe since the emergence of the first portals. Section 3 presents the structure 
of contracts and portals in Germany, emphasizing the broad range of investment structures proposed to the 
crowd; this enables us to derive testable predictions. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 analyzes the 
determinants of campaign outcomes, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Development of the crowdinvesting market in Europe 
 In this section, we outline how the crowdinvesting market has developed in Europe since its 
emergence. Table 1 provides aggregate statistics of the European market. Panel A presents the statistics by 
year, Panel B by country. Panel C shows aggregate statistics by year for Germany only. Column (1) in 
Panel A presents statistics on the number of active crowdinvesting portals that began operating in a given 
year. Column (2) shows the number of successful campaigns that have taken place in a given year 
aggregated for all the identified portals. The first European portals we could identify are Angels Den 
(UK), which began operating in 2007, and WiSEED (France), which began in 2009. However, Angels 
Den was initially oriented mainly to business angels and less to crowd investors. These two portals use 
very different funding frameworks. Angels Den began in the UK but expanded to several Asian countries 
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from 2010 onward. It also began as an online angel network in which the regular crowd could only 
participate after the portal gained more experience. On most portals, when making an investment the 
individual investor legally strikes a contract with the startup and not with the portal, which only drafts and 
brokers the contract. Some portals such as WiSEED deviate from this rule by pooling investors in a 
financial vehicle under the legal form of an LLC, which the portal then manages on behalf of the crowd. 
The management of WiSEED then receives carried interest upon a successful exit, rather than a 
percentage fee after the funding goal is reached. Therefore, the funding structure of WiSEED resembles a 
venture capital investment, with each investment being managed by a distinct investment vehicle.  
 Other than these early entries in the market, the bulk of the European portals entered the market in 
2012 and 2013, with at least 11 new portals with campaign activities in 2012 and 22 in 2013 Europe-wide. 
The same holds for Germany (Table 1, Panel C), where most portals began launching campaigns in 2012 
and 2013, which is also the period in which most of the campaigns took place. As of the end of 2013, we 
identified 132 successful campaigns in Germany and 371 in Europe, including Germany. The total number 
of campaigns begun in Europe is larger as we only cover successful ones. 
 Panel A of Table 1 also documents trends for the 2007–2013 period. The amounts raised have 
steadily grown (Column (3)), while the average number of investors has also increased (Column 4). In 
contrast, the average contribution by an investor has decreased. However, the observed trends should be 
considered with care, because we take the crowdinvesting market at its earliest development period, 
calculating some of the values in Table 1 with very small numbers of observations. Moreover, there is a 
great variation across countries, as evidenced in Panel B. First, the average amounts raised are smaller in 
Germany than in other European countries, a situation largely driven by the UK and Italy, in which very 
large campaigns occur more often. Such large campaigns have taken place in Germany only in recent 
years. Second, the average contribution per investor in Germany is roughly half the amount raised on 
crowdinvesting portals in Europe overall, suggesting that a less sophisticated crowd tends to participate 
more in Germany. This contrasts with the campaigns run in France and some other countries, where 
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wealthy and professional investors contribute more significantly and the average number of investors is 
typically low. 
--- Table 1 About Here --- 
 Panel C of Table 1 shows additional statistics for Germany (Columns (6) and (7)), offering 
insights into the market that we consider for the multivariate analysis. First, Column (6) shows an 
important change that occurred in Germany at the end of 2012, which is the usage of profit-participating 
loans in many crowdinvesting campaigns. Several portals began adopting these contracts at the end of 
2012 and proposed this type of contract to crowd investors and startups as a way to increase campaign size 
beyond the 100,000 EUR threshold, which defined the legal exemption from the securities prospectus for 
all other forms of investments. In 2013, 31.65% of the successful campaigns in Germany offered profit-
participating loans. For 2014, this percentage is even higher (results not reported in the table). However, 
profit-participating loans used in other European countries generally fall under the definition of 
investments under the Prospectus Directive. This is certainly the case in the countries considered in our 
study. A final observation is that the average minimum ticket size decreased over time (Column (7)). This 
reduction was most likely triggered by the adoption of profit-participating loans, as this specific type of 
investment legally allows startups to raise larger amounts overall and thus enables more investors to 
participate.   
 
3. Hypotheses  
The two main rationales for why crowdinvesting markets may arise and have a right to exist are to fill a 
funding gap in the absence of sufficiently developed venture capital and business angel markets and to 
unleash the wisdom of the crowd. The latter does not arise under angel finance or venture capital finance, 
because only a handful of investors engage in due diligence. Thus, the effect of information aggregation 
from a large number of sources is limited. However, if sufficiently knowledgeable, professional investors 
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can better assess the viability of entrepreneurial opportunities than each crowd investor individually and 
thus make overall better decisions. Therefore, it is unclear a priori whether a crowd will be better than 
professional investors. The only study comparing project evaluations by the crowd and experts is that by 
Mollick and Nanda (2014), who find that the crowd selects qualitatively and quantitatively similar projects 
to experts. Kelley and Tetlock (2013) evidence that retail investor orders on regular stock markets convey 
novel information on cash flows. Research on that topic, however, is still nascent, and thus more work 
needs to be done to assess the relative benefits of different types of investors.  
 Psychologists have long examined the wisdom of the crowd (see Larrick et al., 2011, for a 
research overview), investigating conditions under which decisions made by a crowd differ from those of 
an individual and conditions under which the crowd outperforms an individual, who might be an expert or 
not. While different group dynamics, such as the anchoring effect, herding, bias against the minority, and 
common knowledge effect (Zhang and Liu, 2012; Lyon and Pacuit, 2013), may impair the wisdom of the 
crowd, other situations may also lead the crowd to make better decisions when individual information can 
be properly aggregated (see Surrowieki, 2005). Two recent theoretical studies in management and 
economics have shed light on the wisdom of the crowd in the context of crowdfunding and 
crowdinvesting. Csaszar (2014) shows that relying on the judgments of few individuals only can be 
enough to obtain useful information from the crowd as long as the participating individuals have some 
level of knowledge or accuracy in making decisions and are sufficiently diverse. The number of 
participants needed depends on the level of knowledge each individual possesses. The optimal size of the 
crowd depends on the entrepreneur’s capacity to tap the most knowledgeable individuals, as these people 
provide the most valuable feedback. Hakenes and Schlegel (2014) show that the funding goal set by the 
entrepreneur can act as a signal of quality. A high target makes individuals more likely to pledge money in 
an all-or-nothing model because they can be more confident that the campaign will be stopped if not 
enough other individuals have positive information. Cumming et al. (2014) empirically test this conjecture 
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with data from the reward-based crowdfunding portal Indiegogo. They find empirical support for this 
prediction.  
 Existing portals adopt a broad range of structures, some of which affect crowd participation. The 
latter constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving the wisdom of the crowd. These 
differences in the structure of portals can also be driven by factors other than those for the sole purpose of 
affecting crowd participation. One possible explanation to the heterogeneity in portal structure is 
experimentation due to the novelty of the market. Crowdinvesting can be regarded as a financial 
innovation. As with any other form of innovation, there is uncertainty about how to implement it best. 
Eventually, remaining portals could converge toward a limited number of portal designs, similar to how 
venture capital contracts became more standardized over time in the US as the market developed and was 
professionalized. Indeed, Suchman (1995) highlights how similar experimentation in contracting took 
place in the US venture capital industry during the 1980s. Another possible reason is market 
differentiation. Under this view, portals differentiate from each other as a way to reduce competition and 
attract different parts of the crowd. Recent research has shown that the crowd itself is not a homogeneous 
group either (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015). By differentiating from other competitors, portals may 
capture specific segments of the population. Finally, some of the dimensions of portal structure are 
affected by national regulatory constraints, for example, with respect to the maximum offer for a 
campaign without a securities prospectus (Hornuf and Schwienbacher [2015] offer a discussion on the 
prospectus regulation). These examples help explain part of the variation, especially but not exclusively 
across countries. In this study, we test variations in portal and contractual characteristics in Germany, so 
that differences in regulation do not affect our results. 
 The first dimension of differentiation that is likely to affect crowd participation directly is the 
minimum ticket size imposed by the portal to the crowd. While some portals allow investments as little as 
1 EUR or 5 EUR, others impose minimum tickets of 1,000 EUR and even higher amounts. For example, 
research on stock splits has shown that the level of share prices affects investment behavior, as shares with 
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lower prices tend to be more liquid as a result of the participation of a broader investor base (Baker and 
Gallagher, 1980; Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Lin et al., 2009). 
Moreover, high share prices affect the diversification capacity of less wealthy investors and, thus, their 
capacity to reduce exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Transposing this argument to crowdinvesting implies 
that portals imposing very high minimum tickets voluntarily restrict investor participation to the wealthier 
crowd. Investments with a lower ticket size may become affordable to a larger audience. Less wealthy 
investors may therefore prefer companies that offer smaller tickets, so that they can spread their limited 
wealth over more crowdinvesting campaigns. 
A second differentiation among crowdinvesting portals is whether the investments take place 
directly or indirectly, which is likely to affect the composition of the participants. Crowd investors make a 
direct investment when they hold the securities issued by the startup. Most portals in Germany structure 
their offers in that way, except Companisto, which has set up a special purpose vehicle called Companisto 
Venture Capital GmbH. Crowd investors invest in this company, which in turn invests the capital raised in 
the startup. These pooled investments lead to indirect investments because the crowd does not hold 
securities directly from the startup. In Europe, many other portals have adopted pooling, including 
WiSEED (France), MyMicroInvest (Belgium), and Symbid (the Netherlands). One benefit of pooling is 
that crowd investors mutualize some of the costs of managing the investment afterward, which is similar 
in spirit to mutual funds for tradable investments. This rationale becomes particularly important for 
investors that lack skills to monitor their investees themselves and in the context of costly, post-
investment information collection. Here, a concentrated shareholdership that internalizes monitoring costs 
becomes more efficient (Burkart et al., 1997). Moreover, the ownership structure of the startup is 
unaffected by the size of the crowd because, from the perspective of the startup, all the securities are 
issued to the financial vehicle, so there is only one extra shareholder after the campaign comes to a 
successful ending. Such a structure has the advantage that sophisticated investors negotiate with only one 
counterparty in case they want to inject additional capital or when existing shareholders need to be bought 
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out. From the perspective of sophisticated investors, this enables ex ante participation of a larger crowd, 
for which the average amount invested can then be smaller. Moreover, the entrepreneur will prefer the 
pooling of investments because the decision-making process after the campaign would otherwise become 
prohibitively difficult to manage, especially for small entrepreneurial startups with very different types of 
investors (see Leavitt, 2005, in the context of business angels and venture capitalists investing together). 
 Moreover, in contrast with the general perception, the crowd not always purchases common 
shares, even when investments are made directly. While some portals offer common shares, such as 
Bergfürst (Germany), Anaxago (France), and Crowdcube and Seedrs (UK), other portals rely on other 
types of investments, including profit-participating notes, silent partnerships, convertible bonds, and, 
especially in Germany, profit-participating loans. By using these types of securities, German portals avoid 
the involvement of a costly notary, which is required to sell the shares of a private LLC. More important, 
the use of profit-participating loans can be a cost-efficient solution because these loans eliminate the costs 
of drafting and issuing a securities prospectus and, at the same time, are not subject to any regulatory 
limits on the funding goal (Klöhn and Hornuf, 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015). Common shares 
are used in Germany for the very large campaigns by Bergfürst, which enables the portal to run a 
secondary market in which securities can be freely traded. However, such campaigns require a costly 
formal prospectus when the total issuance is more than 100,000 EUR. Given the additional regulatory 
flexbility and, thus, the lower costs involved in large issues, we expect campaigns that offer profit-
participating loans to attract more crowd investors. 
 In Section 5, we test our prediction on the different mechanisms (low minimum ticket, pooled 
investment scheme, and profit-participating loans) using a unique, hand-collected data set for Germany. 
We expect these mechanisms to be associated with greater crowd participation, higher fundraising 
capacity for the startups, and, ultimately, greater success probability of campaings.  
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4. Description of data collection  
 To test our predictions, we hand-collect data on all successful and unsuccessful campaigns 
undertaken in Germany. We collected all the information over time since the German portals’ start. This 
procedure ensures that we have all the campaigns, because portals regularly delete unsuccessful 
campaigns from their websites, leaving mostly success stories visible. Importantly, we have information 
on all the crowdinvesting campaigns undertaken in Germany, including the actual contracts and 
investment documentations if the portals made them available to the crowd. Thus, even deals that were 
deleted by the portals over time appear in our sample. Our sample includes the following German portals 
(in alphabetical order): Bankless24, Bergfürst, Berlin Crowd, BestBC, Companisto, Crowdrange, 
Deutsche Mikroinvest, Devexo, Fundsters, Gründerplus, Innovestment, MyBusinessBacker, 
Power4Projects, Seedmatch, Startkapital Online, and United Equity. This yields an initial sample of 254 
successful and unsuccessful campaigns undertaken by 238 firms from August 1, 2011, to September 31, 
2014. We perform most of the analysis however on a sample of 181 campaigns, because some information 
was not available for all campaigns across the different portals. 
--- Table 2 About Here --- 
 The collected information allows us to construct different variables, as described in detail in 
Table 2, that offer unique insights into contract and portal characteristics. It comprises different measures 
of campaign outcomes (Nbr. Investors, which gives the number of individuals who contributed to the 
campaign; Successful Campaign, a dummy indicating whether the funding goal was achieved; and 
Ln(Amount Raised), the natural logarithm of the overall amount raised during the campaign), measures of 
crowd access related to our predictions (Minimum Ticket in euros; a dummy Small Ticket, for whether the 
size of the minimum ticket is smaller or equal to 250 EUR; Pooled Investment, for whether the crowd is 
pooled in a financial vehicle for the investment in the startup; and Profit-Participating Loans, for whether 
this type of security is used), characteristics of the startup (Funding Goal, which gives the funding goal set 
by the entrepreneur before starting the campaign, and Startup Age, the age of the startup at the time of the 
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campaign), and other portal and contract characteristics (Portal Fee, in percentage, and Portal Experience, 
which counts the number of successful campaigns of the portal before the one considered). We use the 
variable Small Ticket as an alternative proxy for Minimum Ticket, in which the threshold of 250 EUR 
corresponds to the median value of Minimum Ticket. The variables Funding Goal and Startup Age control 
for the size and degree of development of the startup’s project, respectively. The two portal variables 
Portal Fee and Portal Experience control for cost of accessing investments and visibility offered by the 
portal, respectively.    
 
5. Empirical analysis of factors affecting crowdinvesting participation  
 The information available in our data set allows us to test the impact of contract and portal 
characteristics on crowd participation and on the ultimate outcome of crowdinvesting campaigns (success 
and size of fundraising). We describe the data in Section 5.1 and present the multivariate analysis in 
Section 5.2. 
 
5.1. Summary statistics  
 Table 3 presents summary statistics (Panel A), various difference-in-mean tests (Panel B), and a 
correlation matrix (Panel C) of the different variables. The summary statistics offer insights into the 
average campaigns that have taken place so far in Germany. Overall, 83.4% of the campaigns could reach 
their pre-announced funding goal (the dummy Successful Campaign). This percentage is significantly 
higher than what we observe in reward-based crowdfunding portals, such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo 
(Agrawal et al., 2011; Cumming et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014). A possible reason is the significantly lower 
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supply of crowdinvesting projects10, which reduces competition for funds. The average amount pledged 
per campaign is 182,945 EUR with an average funding goal of 69,987 EUR from on average of 251 crowd 
investors. However, there is great variation among campaigns in terms of amounts raised, with a 
maximum of 3 million EUR by Urbanara on Bergfürst and Protonet on Seedmatch. The median values 
also tend to be somewhat lower, as the median amount raised is 100,000 EUR and the median number of 
investors is 166. In general, startups are very young, with an average age of 1.89 years (median of 1 year) 
at the time they undertook their campaign. This suggests that the startups proposed to the crowd are 
typically at the early stage of development, with no audited annual financial statements yet. A closer 
examination of recent campaigns in Germany, however, indicates that a few startups already raised 
follow-up funding in crowdinvesting portals. Although this is still rare, more second-round financing in 
the form of crowdinvesting could occur in the future.  
--- Table 3 About Here --- 
 Regarding contract and portal characteristics, 75.6% of the campaigns have a minimum ticket size 
smaller than or equal to 250 EUR. In some cases, this amount is equal to 1,000 EUR. In addition, 16.6% 
of the investment opportunities are pooled investments. However, as only Companisto structures its 
investments in this form in Germany, this percentage also represents Companisto’s market share. 
Therefore, caution must be taken when interpreting the impact of this variable; it is similar to a dummy 
variable for the portal Companisto. Furthermore, 37.6% of the campaigns use profit-participating loans, 
which are offered by Seedmatch, Companisto, and Deutsche Mikroinvest for part of their campaigns. 
However, none of these portals offered this form of securities throughout the entire period. Moreover, the 
three portals used profit-participating loans in different forms. For example, Companisto used it in the 
form of pooled investments, while the others allowed direct investments from the crowd. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  For example, approximately 250,000 creative projects have been posted on Kickstarter since 2009 (see 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats; accessed August 7, 2015). 
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 Finally, the adoption of different portal structures generates to different levels of fees charged by 
the portals to entrepreneurs and crowd investors. The average portal fee is 8.0%, which also corresponds 
to the median fee. While some portals charge a 5% success fee, others charge up to a 10% flat rate. The 
highest fees in our sample tend to be for portals that facilitate the participation of a larger crowd using 
profit-participating loans and smaller minimum tickets. This is consistent with the intuition that managing 
a larger crowd is more time consuming for the portal. Finally, the time-varying variable Portal Experience 
indicates significant experience of some portals over time.  
 The last column of Panel A in Table 3 shows statistics at the portal level—that is, the average of 
portal means. At times, these values differ greatly from campaign-level statistics because some portals 
have undertaken very few campaigns, so they are over-weighted in portal-level statistics. Moreover, 
differences in campaign-level values indicate large variation of practices among portals, as discussed 
previously.  
 To offer first evidence for our hypotheses, we report in Panel B of Table 3 difference-in-mean 
tests for subsamples of our three dependent variables: Nbr. Investors, Successful Campaign, and 
Ln(Amount Raised). Tests are provided for subsamples of Small Ticket, Profit-Participating Loan, and 
Pooled Investment. The results indicate strong support for our hypotheses because we find that campaigns 
that make use of small tickets, profit-participating loans, and pooled investment are more successful in 
achieving their funding goal, raise more money, and attract more crowd investors. While these findings 
are based on univariate tests, our multivariate regressions in Section 5.2 offer more conclusive evidence.  
Panel C of Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the different variables. Although some pair-
wise correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, these correlations do not create severe 
multicollinearity among the different explanatory variables in the multivariate analysis based on variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values. However, the correlation matrix offers preliminary evidence of the impact of 
these variables on campaign outcomes. More specifically, the variable Nbr. Investors seems strongly 
affected by the contractual mechanisms, consistent with our prediction. In addition, the dummy variable 
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Successful Campaign is positively correlated with larger amounts raised (the variable Ln(Amount Raised)), 
the number of investors, and the use of profit-participating loans but negatively correlated with the size of 
the minimum ticket. Moreover, the correlation matrix indicates that some of the explanatory variables are 
strongly correlated, especially those related to contract characteristics, and thus should be included 
separately. 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis on crowd participation and campaign outcome 
 We now turn to the multivariate regression analysis to test our main predictions on crowd 
participation, based on the different mechanisms identified in Section 3 (the variables Pooled Investment, 
Profit-Participating Loans, Minimum Ticket, and Small Ticket as alternative proxy for minimum ticket 
size). We consider the number of investors that participated in the campaign (Nbr. Investors) as our 
dependent variable. We report negative-binomial regressions for this measure, because the variable is a 
count variable11.  
 At the end of this sub-section, we then test whether these same mechanisms affect the capacity of 
entrepreneurs to raise more funds. To this end, we specify the following dependent variables measuring 
funding success: The first is a dummy variable (the variable Successful Campaign), which takes the value 
of 1 if the funding goal was reached and 0 otherwise. The second variable is the total amount raised for a 
given campaign, regardless of whether the campaign was successful or not (the variable Ln(Amount 
Raised)). We report Probit regressions for the first measure (the dummy Successful Campaign) and OLS 
for the second one (the variable Ln(Amount Raised)). We consider this second variable with care because 
it is bounded at the small issuance exemption for all the securities offered, except profit-participating 
loans. Even in the case of profit-participating loans, startups generally set a funding limit they do not wish 
to exceed. Many of the successful campaigns in our sample were stopped when this upper limit was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 We find qualitatively similar results with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, even when transforming the 
variable Nbr. Investors into ln(Nbr. Investors + 1). Results are available on request. 
! 21!
reached, suggesting that these startups could have raised more but were restricted from doing so either by 
legal constraints or because of the startup’s desire not to raise more. While this does not cause biases for 
the first measure, it does for the second one. 
 We include several control variables reported in Section 5.1 to vary across portals and contracts: 
age of the startup at time of campaign launch (variable Startup Age), which captures the startup’s stage of 
development; the funding goal as defined by the startup (Funding Goal); and specific portal characteristics 
(Portal Fees and Portal Experience). Given the hypotheses we aim to test, our main explanatory variables 
of interest are Pooled Investment, Profit-Participating Loans, Minimum Ticket, and Small Ticket, which 
we test separately. Regressions all include year dummies. We cannot include portal fixed effects, because 
our portal characteristics are mostly constant within portals. However, standard errors are clustered at the 
portal level. We also report mean and maximum of VIF to show the absence of strong collinearity among 
the explanatory variables in the different specifications. All our specifications show maximum VIF values 
below 5 and, in most cases, below 2, suggesting no collinearity problems in our estimations.  
 Table 4 presents the results for the impact on crowd participation based on the variable Nbr. 
Investors. The results lend support to our prediction that different contractual mechanisms facilitate crowd 
participation. First, setting smaller minimum tickets attracts more investors (also confirmed by the Small 
Ticket dummy, as the sign is positive), with each investor likely to invest smaller amounts. A 100 EUR 
increase in minimum ticket size, which is less than one-third of a one standard deviation of the variable 
Minimum Ticket, reduces crowd participation by 79 investors, which is economically meaningful. Second, 
pooled investments have a positive impact on crowd participation. However, the effect is not significant 
across all the specifications. A possible reason is that, similar to the previous mechanism, pooled 
investments are in practice associated with small minimum tickets and therefore grant access to a broader 
range of investors. This is confirmed by the strong negative correlation of –0.4210 (see Table 3) between 
Minimum Ticket and Pooled Investment. Third, use of profit-participating loans also has a positive impact, 
consistent with the notion that it alleviates regulatory constraints and enables broader crowd participation 
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as a result of lower transaction costs for each investor. We therefore find consistent evidence for our 
prediction on the impact of these mechanisms on crowd participation.  
--- Table 4 About Here --- 
Finally, we include an interaction term between Minimum Ticket and Profit-Participating Loans 
(Columns (10) and (11)), to examine whether the combination of both contractual features reinforces the 
positive impact on success (we do not perform the same analysis with Pooled Investment, given the lack 
of variation in the data). The results confirm this reinforcement effect. The impact of the minimum ticket 
size is much larger when it is used in connection with Profit-Participating Loans, though only after we 
control for portal characteristics. 
 We now turn to examining whether the use of these mechanisms that affect crowd participation 
result in more successful and larger campaign outcomes. Because these mechanisms induce more but 
smaller investors to participate, the effect is a priori unclear. Table 5 presents the results for the first 
outcome measure—the dummy variable Successful Campaign for which we use the same specifications as 
in Table 4. First, younger startups are often successful. This finding is robust across most of the 
specifications considered and is consistent with the view that crowdinvesting is most effective for seed 
capital. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in startup age reduces the 
likelihood of a successful campaign by 1.6%–3.5% (depending on the specification considered). Second, 
startups running a campaign on a portal requiring larger investment tickets are less successful (also 
confirmed by the Small Ticket dummy), possibly because they attract fewer and potentially more 
specialized and/or wealthier investors at the expense of larger crowd participation. A 100 EUR increase in 
minimum ticket size (i.e., less than one-third of a one standard deviation of the variable Minimum Ticket) 
reduces the likelihood of achieving a successful campaign by 2%–3%, which is economically meaningful. 
Similarly, pooling investments and using profit-participating loans is related to more investors because of 
the lower regulatory costs when exceeding the small offerings excemption, which would otherwise require 
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a securities prospectus. Finally, portal fees have no impact, but we find weak evidence that the portal’s 
experience has a positive effect.  
--- Table 5 About Here --- 
 Table 6 shows the results for the second outcome measure Ln(Amount Raised). This alternative 
measure gives insights into the overall size of the campaign outcome. Several of the findings observed for 
our first outcome measure are also observed here. However, because these two measures capture different 
perspectives of outcome, differences in findings are possible. While Table 5 provides evidence that 
younger startups are more successful, we find here that they also tend to raise larger amounts. Although 
this finding is not robust across all the specifications, coefficients have consistently the same sign. We 
also find similar results for other contract characteristics; those facilitating broader participation (i.e., 
lower minimum tickets) result in larger amounts being raised. As expected, the use of profit-participating 
loans has a positive impact on the amounts raised. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
Minimum Ticket and Profit-Participating Loans is not statistically significant across the different 
specifications (only for Column (10) where we do not control for portal characteristics), suggesting that 
there is no differential effect of minimum ticket size in combination with this specific type of security. 
Portals with greater experience tend to offer better chances of achieving higher amounts. This suggests 
that the more experienced portals attract more potential investors, resulting in larger campaign outcomes. 
This positive effect may be due to the larger network of investors that established portals could develop 
over time.  
--- Table 6 About Here --- 
 
5.3. Further analysis and robustness checks 
 We performed a series of robustness checks. First, we checked for outliers and winsorized some of 
the main variables at the 3% level. Note that many of the variables do not need winsorizing because they 
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are dummy variables. The two main variables more prone to having outliers are Nbr. Investors (for the 
analysis in Table 4) and Ln(Amount Raised) (for the analysis in Table 6). When re-running the regressions 
in Tables 4 and 6 with these two winsorized variables (winsorized only at the upper level, not lower level, 
as both are bounded), we obtain similar results in terms of statistical significance for the variables related 
to our hypotheses. These results suggest that our conclusions are robust to outliers.  
 Next, we included portal fixed effects because other portal-specific factors may be at play. 
However, some of the variables included in our analysis are invariant within portals, which leads to 
significant costs related to the inclusion of portal fixed effects. In addition, the interpretation of 
coefficients changes, as we then capture within-portal effects. For the remaining variables that vary within 
at least some of the portals, most results remain qualitatively similar, as before. 
 A further extension examined is whether the amount of information made available at the 
beginning of the campaign affects the outcomes. To investigate this question, we rely on the content of 
business plans that were uploaded on the campaign website before its start, as it constitutes the main 
information made available to the crowd. Overall, we find only minimal evidence that business plan 
length affects outcome (results available on request). In summary, our conclusions are similar to those 
obtained for venture capitalists. Indeed, Kirsch et al. (2009) investigate the impact of business plans on 
venture finance and find that they have little effect on investment decisions of venture capitalists. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper uses a large European data set that offers descriptive insights into the development of 
crowdinvesting, a recent phenomenon that has experienced strong growth and may become an additional 
source of finance for startup entrepreneurs. This study contributes to knowledge of entrepreneurial finance 
and crowdinvesting in several ways. In contrast with other studies, our data set covers many portals from 
different European countries in which crowdinvesting could develop. Thus, we are able to empirically 
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document the emergence of crowdinvesting in Europe. Moreover, our German data set is unique in that 
we include successful and unsuccessful campaigns, which allows us to draw conclusions about which 
contract and portal characteristics contribute to entrepreneurial fundraising success on crowdinvesting 
portals. These findings are relevant for entrepreneurs who need to choose among a larger range of 
different portals, as evidenced in this paper. Choosing the right portal and contract helps raise larger 
amounts of money and affects the size of the crowd participating in the campaign. The latter may in turn 
affect the extent to which entrepreneurs can rely on the wisdom of the crowd. 
 One potential limitation lies in the extent to which entrepreneurs’ ability to strategically select the 
portal on which they wish to run their campaign affects causality. Although rejection rates of submitted 
proposals by entrepreneurs are very high for crowdinvesting portals12, good projects may be able to self-
select. In this case, contract characteristics may no longer by exogenous factors, because these 
entrepreneurs may opt for a portal that uses specific contractual features.  
 Our analysis sheds light on ways the crowdinvesting market may develop in the US after 
implementation of the CROWDFUND Act of the JOBS Act by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which will allow non-sophisticated investors to participate in equity crowdfunding. It seems reasonable to 
assume that US portals will evolve in response to the entry of the regular crowd in order to offer contracts 
that allow the participation of more investors. Some of these contracts may resemble the ones currently in 
place in Europe, which affect crowd participation in different ways. 
 At the same time, these findings offer new research avenues for entrepreneurship scholars. One 
immediate research question is whether successful crowdinvesting affects the viability of the crowd-
invested startups. While crowdinvesting offers funds that enable entrepreneurs to develop their business 
ideas, crowd investors are likely to offer less value-add than business angels or venture capitalists. The 
latter may also be more skilled than the crowd in screening business opportunities. Thus, the question 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 On June 4, 2015, the CEO of Companisto indicated to one of the authors that 74 out of 75 applications are rejected 
by the portal. Klöhn and Hornuf (2012) report that Seedmatch rejected 39 out of 40 startups in 2012. 
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whether crowdinvesting is a worthwhile alternative to other sources of entrepreneurial finance for 
innovative startups is one worth exploring empirically. Another area for entrepreneurship scholars is to 
examine how entrepreneurs can best make use of the crowd as potential idea-bringing stakeholders and 
how the form of investment proposed during the crowdinvesting campaign may affect this use. Indeed, the 
different securities do not offer the same form of incentives or compensation to the participating crowd. 
Gaining a better understanding of how the design of crowdinvesting campaigns affects the participation of 
the crowd after the campaign may help entrepreneurs make the best use of this novel form of finance.  
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Table 1 
Development of the European crowdinvesting market, by year and country. 
This table presents summary statistics on portals and successful crowdinvesting campaigns, by year. Panel 
A considers the full sample, Panel B for each country separately, and Panel C only the German sample. 
Values reported are based on the restricted sample of successful campaigns (i.e., campaigns that have 
achieved their funding goal), as information on failed campaigns is generally not available. Data were first 
collected in October 2013 and then updated in September 2014 for any additional campaigns that took 
place until the end of 2013, mostly using the information available on the portals' websites for registered 
users. Several portals were also willing to provide the needed information directly. We further searched 
the Internet for missing information. To the best of our knowledge, the considered portals represent the 
bulk of the crowdinvesting activities in their countries (the full list of portals is available on request). 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the full sample, by year 
Column (1) gives the number of portals that have begun operating and launched their first campaign. 
Column (2) gives the number of successful campaigns. For Germany, we only include successful 
campaigns; unsuccessful campaigns are added in Tables 3–6 only. For all other countries, we do not have 
any information on unsuccessful campaigns. Column (3) gives the average amount raised (in euros), 
where we apply an exchange rate of €1 = £0.8 for the campaigns promoted in the UK. Column (4) gives 
the average number of investors participating in the campaigns. Column (5) is the ratio of the two 
previous columns. Column (6) gives the total annual volume of transactions; i.e., the multiplication of 
Columns (2) and (3) (rounded in thousands). The last row (denoted “All Years”) gives the average value 
across all the years, except for Columns (1) and (2), which provide the sum. 
  
              
YEAR EUROPEAN SAMPLE 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  
Nbr. Portals 
Started 
Nbr. Successful 
Campaigns, incl. for 
Germany 
Amount 
Raised 
Nbr. 
Investors 
Investor 
Contribution 
Total Volume of 
Fundraising 
(rounded) 
2007–2009 2 1  € 60,000  11.00  € 5,455   € 60,000  
2010 1 9  € 100,589  61.56  € 1,634   € 905,000  
2011 6 20  € 167,608  88.12  € 1,902   € 3,352,000  
2012 11 107  € 108,433  126.46  € 857   € 11,602,000  
2013 22 234  € 248,115  180.63  € 1,374   € 58,059,000  
All Years 42 371  € 196,222  152.05  € 1,291   € 72,798,000  
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Panel B: Summary statistics for the full sample, by country 
Columns (1) to (5) are as described in Panel A, but calculated for each country separately.  
  
     COUNTRY EUROPEAN SAMPLE 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Nbr. Portals 
Started 
Nbr. Successful 
Campaigns 
Amount 
Raised Nbr. Investors 
Investor 
Contribution 
Austria 2 5  € 108,970  140.00  € 778  
Belgium 1 2  € 84,000  78.50  € 1,070  
France 5 49  € 191,819  47.67  € 4,024  
Germany 16 132  € 177,371  244.55  € 725  
Italy 1 12  € 387,758  N/A  N/A  
The Netherlands 2 23  € 57,592  124.50  € 463  
Switzerland 1 8  N/A  N/A  N/A  
UK 14 141  € 223,385  99.14  € 2,253  
 
 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics for the German sample only 
Column (1) gives the number of portals that have begun operating and launched their first campaign. 
Column (2) gives the number of successful campaigns (unsuccessful campaigns are added in Tables 3–6 
only). Column (3) gives the average amount raised (in euros). Column (4) gives the average number of 
investors participating in the campaigns. Column (5) is the ratio of the two previous columns. Column (6) 
provides summary statistics for the relative use of profit-participating loans and Column (7) for the 
minimum ticket size for investments. The last row (denoted “All Years”) gives the average value across 
all the years, except for Columns (1) and (2), which provide the sum. 
 
YEAR GERMAN SAMPLE 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
  
Nbr. Portals 
Started 
Nbr. 
Successful 
Campaigns 
Amount 
Raised 
Nbr. 
Investors 
Investor 
Contribution 
Use of Profit-
Participating 
Loans 
Minimum 
Ticket Size 
2007–2009 0 0  --   --   --   --   --  
2010 0 0  --   --   --   --   --  
2011 2 5  € 89,850  116.40  € 772  0.00%  € 400  
2012 5 48  € 93,609  166.12  € 564  4.17%  € 394  
2013 9 79  € 241,112  313.74  € 769  31.65%  € 278  
All Years 16 132  € 177,371  244.55  € 725  20.45%  € 327  
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Table 2 
Definition of variables used in the multivariate analysis (German sample). 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent Variables: 
Successful Campaign Dummy variable equal to 1 if funding goal set by the entrepreneur is achieved; that is, the 
ratio of “Amount Raised” to “Funding Goal” is greater than or equal to 1. 
Ln(Amount Raised) Natural logarithm of the total amount raised (in euros) during the campaign. 
Nbr. Investors Number of crowd investors having invested during the campaign. 
Startup Characteristics: 
Funding Goal  Funding goal (in thousands of euros) set by the entrepreneur before the start of the 
campaign. In general, the entrepreneur also sets a funding limit, which at times may be the 
same as the minimum.  
Startup Age Age in years of the startup at time of the crowdinvesting campaign. 
Portal and Contract Characteristics: 
Minimum Ticket The minimum amount (in euros) that any crowd investor needs to invest to be allowed to 
participate. 
Small Ticket Dummy variable equal to 1 if “Minimum Ticket” is smaller than or equal to 250 EUR and 0 
otherwise. The value of 250 EUR corresponds to the median of the reference variable 
“Minimum Ticket” (see Panel A in Table 3).  
Pooled Investment Dummy variable equal to 1 if the portal pools crowd investors in a specific financial vehicle 
and 0 otherwise. In a pooled investment, the crowd does not hold securities directly from 
the startup but from the financial vehicle. The vehicle then invests the crowd investors' 
money in the startup. In Germany, only Companisto offers pooled investment schemes. 
Profit-Participating 
Loans 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if crowd investors are offered an investment in the form of a 
profit-participating loans (in German: partiarisches Darlehen) and 0 otherwise. 
Portal Fee Fee (in percentage) charged by the portal in the event of a successful campaign; for portals 
that report a range (e.g., 5%–10%), we take the average. 
Portal Experience Number of campaigns run by the portal before the considered campaign. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics and correlation matrix of main variables (German sample). 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics of different variables (number of observations, arithmetic mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum value, maximum value). The last column reports mean values at the 
portal level; i.e., mean values of portal averages. Panel B reports difference-in-mean tests between 
different subsamples for our different dependent variables. Panel C reports pair-wise correlations among 
the main variables. All the variables are defined in Table 2. Significance level in Panel B: * < 1%. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
        
Variable Nbr. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Mean  (Portal-level) 
        
Successful Campaign 181 0.834 1 0.373 0 1 0.674 
Ln(Amount Raised) 181 11.425 11.513 1.218 7.313 14.914 11.135 
Amount Raised (in €) 181 182,945 100,000 346,679 1,500 3,000,000 291,673 
Nbr. Investors 165 251.339 166 300.273 2 1,982 212.738 
Funding Goal (in €1000) 181 69.987 50 220.896 10 3,000 249.583 
Startup Age (in years) 181 1.890 1 3.197 0 34 2.173 
Minimum Ticket (in €) 180 359.544 250 377.727 1 1000 174.355 
Small Ticket 180 0.756 1 .431 0 1 0.929 
Pooled Investment 181 0.166 0 0.373 0 1 0.067 
Profit-Participating Loan 181 0.376 0 0.486 0 1 0.256 
Portal Fee (in %) 176 8.026 8 0.660 7.500 10 8.318 
Portal Experience 181 21.088 17 17.500 1 65 7.470 
        
 
Panel B: Difference-in-mean tests 
 
    Variable for Subsample Successful Campaign Ln(Amount Raised) Nbr. Investors 
    Small Ticket = 1 0.912 11.703 338.192 
Small Ticket = 0 0.614 10.597 19.636 
          Diff-in-mean test (p-value) 4.961 (0.000) 5.676 (0.000) 6.794 (0.000) 
Profit-Participating Loan = 1 0.941 12.279 452.765 
Profit-Participating Loan = 0 0.770 10.911 110.134 
          Diff-in-mean test (p-value) 3.061 (0.0025) 8.704 (0.000) 8.705 (0.000) 
Pooled Investment = 1 1.000 11.953 649.833 
Pooled Investment = 0 0.801 11.320 162.785 
          Diff-in-mean test (p-value) 2.712 (0.007) 2.642 (0.009) 10.290 (0.000) 
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Panel C: Correlation matrix  
 
                
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
[1] Successful Campaign    1.0000  
      [2] Ln(Amount Raised)    0.6220*   1.0000  
     [3] Funding Goal   -0.1856    0.2369*   1.0000  
    [4] Nbr. Investors    0.2826*   0.6534*   0.1792   1.0000  
   [5] Startup Age   -0.0574   -0.1032   -0.0090   0.0010   1.0000  
  [6] Minimum Ticket   -0.3263*  -0.3453*  -0.0380  -0.5311* -0.1016   1.0000  
 [7] Pooled Investment    0.1987*   0.1937*  -0.0809   0.6275* -0.0498  -0.4210*  1.0000  
[8] Profit-Participating Loan    0.2231*   0.5453*  -0.0456   0.5634* -0.0590  -0.3997*  0.3292* 
[9] Portal Fee    0.0405   -0.0533   -0.2839*  0.3405* -0.0926  -0.2109*  0.6716* 
[10] Portal Experience    0.1155    0.3626*  -0.0680   0.1605  -0.0840   0.1819  -0.1427  
      
       [8] [9] 
     [8] Profit-Participating Loan    1.0000  
      [9] Portal Fee    0.0051    1.0000  
     [10] Portal Experience    0.5347*  -0.3188*  
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Table 4 
Determinants of number of investors.  
 
The dependent variable is Nbr. Investors, the number of investors having pledged capital during the campaign. We report negative-binomial 
regressions because the dependent variable is a count variable. All the variables are defined in Table 2. All the regressions include year dummies. 
Coefficients reported are average marginal effects. The term “Min. Ticket*Profit-Particip.” corresponds to the interaction term of Minimum Ticket 
and Profit-Participating Loan. Standard errors are clustered at the portal level. Significance levels: * < 10%, ** < 5%, and *** < 1%. The last row 
reports average value of VIFs (maximum value in parentheses). 
 
            Explanatory Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
            
Startup Age -7.9018 -8.6477 -3.0232 3.8109 -7.9875 -9.3760 -1.5786 -2.6275 6.8856 -2.1475 1.7690 
Minimum Ticket -0.7947***      -0.8017***   -0.5843*** -0.6424*** 
Small Ticket  664.2789***          
Pooled Investment   335.9979***     641.6829***    
Profit-Participating Loan    510.4766***     681.4384*** 369.5996*** 323.9085*** 
Min. Ticket*Profit-Particip.          -0.2087** -0.2801 
Portal Fee     80.4463  92.5224 -194.5327 140.6342  72.4786 
Portal Experience      -0.0644 6.7396*** 2.7930 -1.6139  4.7712*** 
Funding Goal 0.0750*** 0.0869*** 0.1724*** 0.2207*** -0.3751 0.0950* 1.2715* 0.7283 -0.8688 0.1632*** 0.7861 
Year dummies Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nbr. Observations 164 164 165 165 160 165 160 160 160 164 160 
Pseudo R-square 0.083 0.079 0.032 0.043 0.014 0.010 0.100 0.051 0.061 0.108 0.120 
Average VIF (max.) 1.10 (1.28) 1.10 (1.26) 1.09 (1.23) 1.22 (1.52) 1.16 (1.28) 1.19 (1.36) 1.45 (2.03) 1.42 (1.95) 1.51 (2.16) 1.62 (3.31) 2.36 (5.03) 
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Table 5 
Determinants of campaign success.  
 
The dependent variable is Successful Campaign, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the funding goal is achieved during the campaign and 0 otherwise. 
We report marginal effects of Probit regressions. All the variables are defined in Table 2. All the regressions include year dummies. The term 
“Min. Ticket*Profit-Particip.” corresponds to the interaction term of Minimum Ticket and Profit-Participating Loan. Standard errors are clustered 
at the portal level. Significance levels: * < 10%, ** < 5%, and *** < 1%. The last row reports average value of VIFs (maximum value in 
parentheses). 
 
                      
 Explanatory Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
            Startup Age -0.0110*** -0.0107*** -0.0062* -0.0045 -0.0106*** -0.0067 -0.0064*** -0.0076*** -0.0056* -0.0086*** -0.0060*** 
Minimum Ticket -0.0002*** 
     
-0.0003*** 
  
-0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
Small Ticket 
 
0.2146*** 
         Pooled Investment 
  
0.9783** 
    
0.9841*** 
   Profit-Participating Loan 
   
0.2245*** 
    
0.2601*** 0.0965 1.1649*** 
Min. Ticket*Profit-Particip. 
         
0.0001 -0.0045*** 
Portal Fee 
    
-0.0087 
 
0.0219 -0.0601 0.0188 
 
0.0037 
Portal Experience 
     
0.0024 0.0054*** 0.0015 -0.0003 
 
0.0047** 
Funding Goal -0.0014** -0.0015*** -0.0012** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0019* -0.0009 -0.0014** -0.0023*** -0.0016*** -0.0010 
Year dummies Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nbr. Observations 180 180 181 181 176 181 176 176 176 180 176 
Pseudo-R-square 0.186 0.199 0.123 0.143 0.068 0.084 0.229 0.135 0.158 0.202 0.243 
BIC 160.49 158.48 173.81 170.48 171.59 180.09 157.61 171.84 168.34 168.37 165.81 
Average VIF (max.) 1.10 (1.28) 1.10 (1.26) 1.09 (1.23) 1.22 (1.52) 1.16 (1.28) 1.19 (1.36) 1.45 (2.03) 1.42 (1.95) 1.51 (2.16) 1.62 (3.31) 2.36 (5.03) 
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Table 6 
Determinants of campaign size. 
 
The dependent variable is Ln(Amount Raised), the natural logarithm of the amount (in euros) raised during the campaign. We report OLS 
regressions. All the variables are defined in Table 2. All the regressions include year dummies. The term “Min. Ticket*Profit-Particip”  
corresponds to the interaction term of Minimum Ticket and Profit-Participating Loan. Standard errors are clustered at the portal level. Significance 
levels: * < 10%, ** < 5%, and *** < 1%. The last row reports average value of VIFs (maximum value in parentheses). 
 
            Explanatory Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
            Startup Age -0.0607*** -0.0610*** -0.0464** -0.0170 -0.0571*** -0.0323 -0.0199 -0.0225* -0.0091 -0.0273 -0.0119 
Minimum Ticket -0.0010*** 
     
-0.0017*** 
  
-0.0006*** -0.0012*** 
Small Ticket 
 
1.0395*** 
         Pooled Investment 
  
0.5980 
    
1.4942** 
   Profit-Participating Loan 
   
1.5144*** 
    
1.4638*** 1.0366*** 1.0009*** 
Min. Ticket*Profit-Particip. 
         
0.0017** -0.0009 
Portal Fee 
    
-0.1309 
 
0.2198 -0.3541 0.0813 
 
0.0969 
Portal Experience 
     
0.0238* 0.0377*** 0.0231* 0.0074 
 
0.0242*** 
Funding Goal 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0048 0.0014*** 0.0119*** 0.0103*** 0.0059** 0.0014*** 0.0103*** 
Year dummies Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nbr. Observations 180 180 181 181 176 181 176 176 176 180 176 
R-square 0.223 0.259 0.160 0.385 0.112 0.213 0.414 0.297 0.398 0.410 0.469 
Average VIF (max.) 1.10 (1.28) 1.10 (1.26) 1.09 (1.23) 1.22 (1.52) 1.16 (1.28) 1.19 (1.36) 1.45 (2.03) 1.42 (1.95) 1.51 (2.16) 1.62 (3.31) 2.36 (5.03) 
 
 
